Improving High-Bandwidth TLS in the FreeBSD kernel

Randall Stewart  
Netflix Inc.  
121 Albright Way  
Los Gatos, CA 95032  
USA  
Email: rrs@netflix.com

Scott Long  
Netflix Inc.  
121 Albright Way  
Los Gatos, CA 95032  
USA  
Email: scottl@netflix.com

Abstract—In our 2015 paper, “Optimizing TLS for High-Bandwidth Applications in FreeBSD”, we demonstrated the cost of TLS encryption on high-bandwidth video serving on Netflix’s OpenConnect Appliance (OCA [1]) and explored methods for reducing that cost via in-kernel encryption. The results showed that such a concept is feasible, but only a small performance gain was achieved. In this paper we describe the improvements made since then to reduce the cost of encryption. We also compare the performance of several different bulk encryption implementations.

I. INTRODUCTION

The importance of Transport Layer Security [2] (TLS) continues to grow as businesses and their customers come to appreciate the value of communication privacy. Netflix announced in 2015 that it would start on the path to encrypting the video and audio playback sessions of its streaming service in an attempt to help users protect their viewing privacy [3]. Enabling this comes with a significant computational cost to the OpenConnect serving platform, so work continues in exploring and implementing new ways to optimize TLS bulk encryption and thus lower capital and operational costs.

An OCA is a FreeBSD-based appliance that serves movies and television programming to Netflix subscribers. Confidential customer data like payment information, account authentication, and search queries are exchanged via an encrypted TLS session between the client and the various application servers that make up the Netflix infrastructure. The audio and video objects are statically encrypted by Digital Rights Management (DRM) that is pre-encoded into the objects prior to them being distributed to the OCA network for serving.

The Netflix OpenConnect Appliance is a server-class computer based on an Intel 64bit Xeon CPU and running FreeBSD 10.2 and Nginx 1.9. The platform evolves yearly as commodity components increase in capability and decrease in price; the most recent generation of the platform holds between 10TB and 200TB of multimedia objects, and can accommodate anywhere from 10,000 to 40,000 simultaneous long-lived TCP sessions with customer client systems. The servers are also designed to deliver between 10Gbps and 40Gbps of continuous bandwidth utilization. Communication with the client is over the HTTP protocol, making the system essentially into a large static-content web server.

Until 2015, these audio and video objects were not encrypted on a per-session basis. Netflix is now in the process of revising and releasing its client playback software to include support for TLS playback encryption, with the goal of updating all playback devices that are both capable of being upgraded and have the computational capacity to support TLS decryption. By the end of 2016 we expect the majority of streaming sessions to be using TLS encryption.

As the number of client sessions doing TLS grows across the OpenConnect network, demand increases on the server-side to accommodate these sessions. Building on the results from our work in 2015 [4], we looked for ways to reduce the cost of encryption on our deployed fleet of hardware as well as reduce the number of servers needed to accommodate future growth. This investigation covered three areas: what is the ideal cipher for bulk encryption, what is the best implementation of the chosen cipher, and are there ways to improve the data path to and from that cipher implementation.

II. BULK CIPHER SELECTION

The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) is commonly used to implement bulk data encryption for TLS sessions as it is well studied and relatively easy to implement. However it comes with a high computational cost as the plaintext data must be processed twice, once to generate the encrypted output, and once to generate the SHA hash that verifies the integrity of the encrypted data. The AES-GCM cipher, based on Galois/Counter Mode (GCM [5]), provides adequate data protection and does not require that the plaintext be processed twice. It is included in TLS 1.2 and later and is available in all modern versions of OpenSSL and its derivatives. Decryption is also computationally cheap, and this combined with ubiquitous availability makes it attractive to both client and server platforms.

We decided that we would transition our TLS platform to prefer GCM, and fall back to CBC only for primitive clients that couldn’t be upgraded to support GCM. We estimate that once TLS is rolled out to our entire network that only a small percentage of playback sessions will use CBC.
III. CIPHER IMPLEMENTATION

Synthetic performance testing of the OpenCrypto Framework AES-CBC cipher showed it to be less performant than the equivalent implementation from OpenSSL. We also needed to investigate AES-GCM performance, but found that OpenSSL 1.0.1 as of early 2015 did not have an AESNI-optimized implementation for it. Our search for alternatives led us to BoringSSL [6], which had a well-performing AESNI implementation of AES-GCM.

In mid–2015 we were introduced to the Intel Intelligent Storage Acceleration Library (ISA-L [7]). It provided an implementation of AES-GCM that was hand-tuned for specific Intel model families and their instruction sets. Testing showed it to be an improvement over the BoringSSL ciphers. Results are included below.

One drawback to the ISA-L was that it was written in the YASM dialect, which is not directly compatible with the GCC and LLVM toolchain assemblers in FreeBSD. That required us to modify the kernel makefile infrastructure in a rudimentary way to allow YASM to be called as an external assembler on the needed source files, as so:

```
compile-with */usr/local/bin/yasm -g dwarf2
-f elf64 ${INTELISAINCLUDES} -o ${.TARGET}
$S/contrib/intel_isa/aes/${.PREFIX}.asm
```

IV. DATA PATH IMPROVEMENTS

Our initial work in 2015 [4] used the AESNI implementation built into FreeBSD and the Open Crypto Framework (OCF) to perform bulk encryption. The results in our previous paper showed a small improvement in performance, but not nearly the results we had hoped to gain. We knew of several areas where our results could be improved including:

1) Extra copies were being made during kernel data processing due to the encrypt in-place requirement of our AESNI implementation.
2) The nginx calls into the TLS code were not passing in correct flags with the sendfile(2) call. This meant that hot content was not being properly cached.
3) Many times during processing an mbuf chain was walked to gain addresses for encryption; this constant walking of the mbuf linked lists caused added overhead. We also embedded initialization routine and the UMA constructor would only be used to reset pointers within the tied entity. We also embedded the reference count within the mbuf. This required some small tricks with copies (we don’t actually free the original mbuf until all copies are free) but proved quite effective at reducing mbuf overhead.

Switching to the iovec array forced us to abandon the OpenCrypto Framework API and access the cipher routines directly. We still wanted to be able to fall back to OpenCrypto for testing purposes, so we created a layer that abstracts the memory allocation and iovec handling for low-level cipher access while still allowing interoperability with OpenCrypto. The translation is transparent to the upper layers and is selectable at runtime. This work also gave us the chance to find and fix codepaths that were making unnecessary copies of data. We also fixed the incorrect sendfile flag usage.

V. RESULTS

After adding all the improvements we deployed our new firmware on three different machines. These machines were fed live traffic while gathering CPU and bandwidth measurements during busy hours. The same software was used in all measurements the only difference being changes to the configuration so that the software would: 1) Disable all sendfile enhancements and use just OpenSSL, reading from the file and writing the encrypted data down the TCP connection.
2) Using the sendfile enhancement with the encryption set to use boringSSL.
3) Using the sendfile enhancement with the encryption set to use Intel’s ISA library.

Thus each machine provided us with three sets of results. The machine types were as follows:

1) Rev H storage (HDD) platform, CPU E5-2650Lv2 at 1.7Ghz with 20 cores (Hyperthreaded) the cpu class being an Ivy Bridge Xeon.
2) Rev F Flash (SSD) cache platform, CPU E5-2697v2 at 2.7Ghz with 24 cores (Hyperthreaded) the cpu class being an Ivy Bridge Xeon.
3) Rev N Flash (SSD) cache platform, CPU E5-2697v3 at 2.6Ghz with 28 cores (Hyperthreaded) the cpu class being a Haswell Xeon.

Each sets of results will be labeled Rev H, Rev F or Rev N with the test undergone. We show approximately one hour of traffic during a busy period. For visual clarity, the legends have been removed from the graphs; the green x plots are bandwidth in Gbps, and the red + plots are CPU system usage percentage.

We see in Fig 1 what happens when only OpenSSL is used. The CPU limits we have set are the standard 80%, however the storage cache is disk bound hitting between 60-65% CPU and topping our performance out at about 12-12.5Gbps of serving traffic. The sendfile feature adds considerable improvement as we see in the next two figures.

The results of BoringSSL, in kernel using sendfile, are seen in Fig 2. The CPUs tend to be used a bit more (55-70% CPU...
utilization) with overall output performance increasing to 15-16Gbps. This is what we expect with use of the sendfile call to help streamline the I/O.

For final comparison we put in-place the ISA library, again in kernel with sendfile, results can be seen in Fig 3 and show another improvement moving us to as much as 18G but generally holding around 16-16.5G.

In Fig 4 we see OpenSSL this time hitting maximum CPU. This is because SSDs have a significantly greater I/O capacity so we no longer hit the disk limits seen in the Rev H. We see that running with an average of 80% CPU we maintain somewhere between 22-23Gbps. This gives us our baseline to compare any improvements.

In Fig 5 we see the results of using the kernel encryption with sendfile and BoringSSL, here we are able to maintain between 25-25.5Gbps while maintaining our goal of 80% CPU utilization.

The ISA library shown in Fig 6 gives us a slight improvement over the previous results getting us again around 25-25.5G but tending to stay towards the higher end of the range.
Both the Rev F and Rev H are Ivy Bridge machines (v2 CPU’s). We anticipate better performance out of a Haswell machine (v3 CPU). Our Rev N shows promising results in the next set of figures.

Interestingly the OpenSSL results seen in Fig 7 do not reach the full CPU target of 80%. Checking the machine health statistics we found that the SSDs had reached their maximum at around 29-30Gps that we see maintained in the graph. In Fig 8 we see us reach the interfaces maximum capacity of 35.5-36Gbps, with the CPU tending to stay around 53% with a burst up to 57% at one point. The ISA library results can be seen in Fig 9 and show similar results to what we see in the BoringSSL case with the exception that our CPU use is tending to stay towards 50.5%. The results are tabulated in Table I.

VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

With our latest work overall performance has improved as much as 30%, a vast improvement from our original results. Still left unexplored is use of offload cards to assist in our efforts to encrypt all data. One question we have is if a card can be used in our hardware design in such a way that it takes less CPU and PCIe bandwidth than just running the AESNI instructions themselves? As new generations of Intel CPU’s become available it is possible that the cost of feeding data to an auxiliary card and collecting the encrypted results will be more than the actual AESNI instructions themselves.

We were also forced to set aside the OpenCrypto Framework in order to achieve certain optimization. Similar optimizations might be useful for other crypto consumers in the kernel, so we will explore ways to extend the OCF API as we work to move the code upstream to FreeBSD.

Encrypting in software still requires that data pages get touched by the CPU, causing CPU cache pollution. The data is almost never re-used, so the caching is wasted and needlessly evicts other system data that could be re-used. We are currently investigating fine-grained use of cache-control features of the Intel CPUs to limit the amount of data that is put into the last–layer caches during encryption. We are also working with the Intel ISA-L team to develop routines that use uncached load/store assembly opcodes for data movement through the cipher.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the Intel ISA-L team for reaching out to us to assist in achieving our performance goals, and David Wolfskill and Warner Losh for their support and reviews. We would also like to thank the entire Netflix OpenConnect team for providing an outstanding environment for this work.

REFERENCES